In this second section of Richard Muller’s, Christ and the Decree, he investigates three influential reformers who were contemporaries of John Calvin: Bullinger, Musculus, and Vermigli. Unlike the Lutheran tradition, of whom Martin Luther was the source, the Reformed tradition had many influences apart of John Calvin. Since this is the case, an investigation into the Reformed doctrines of predestination and Christology ought consider these sources – Muller restricts his analysis to these three.
Heinrich Bullinger (1504-1575) was Zwingli’s successor in Zurich and produces three massive theological works: The Decades, The Compendium of Christian Religion, and the Second Helvetic Confession. Bullinger develops a strong covenant-promise motif through his theology stemming from his exegesis of the protoevangelion of Genesis 3. Christ becomes the mediator of this covenant of grace and executes the decree. Bullinger has a functional Christology drawn not from the Anselmic theory as Calvin does, but rather from the historical goal of covenant promises. With this historical-redemptive emphasis, it is no wonder then, that Bullinger’s doctrine of predestination is set within the soteriological locus of the Second Helvetic Confession. Since election is executed in Christ, the Mediator, reprobation is outside of Christ and its causal explanation must be passed over in silence.
Wolfgang Musculus (1497-1563) was a highly reputed exegete and theologian who taught theology in Bern and produced commentaries on books of the Bible, and his Loci Communes in 1560. He emphasised a General Covenant between God and creation, and a Special Covenant between God and the elect, and Christ was the Mediator of the Special Covenant. So concerned with the historical effecting of God’s salvation was he, that he placed the atonement prior to Christology in his Loci. He follows Calvin in utilising Anselm when formulating his functional Christology, and points out that Christ is the elect whereby he is the chosen head of the chosen people. He includes a careful, and scholastic discussion of election and foreknowledge which produces less of a causal rigor than Calvin’s discussion of election.
Peter Martyr Vermigli (1500-1562) was an Oxford lecturer whose work was arranged and published posthumously by Robert Masson in 1576. Interestingly, Masson arranged Vermigli’s Loci Communes as per Calvin’s 1559 Institutes. Vermigli’s Christology follows the Reformed functional tradition of not separating the person and work of Christ. On predestination, Vermigli’s work is completely different in approach to Calvin, but produces the same results. Vermigli employs scholastic distinctions between absolute necessity (necessitas consequentis) and necessity of consequence (necessitas consequentiae) to differentiate between what we might know as primary and secondary causes. This distinction produces the main difference between Vermigli and Calvin with the term ‘predestination.’ Because Vermigli accepts what Calvin rejects (a ‘permissive will’ in God), he would apply the term ‘predestination’ to the work of God in the salvation of the elect, and not to the passing over of the reprobate. This highlights the fact that the concept of a ‘double decree’ in predestination was not simply a 17th century discussion, but an early orthodox one.
Epilogue:
Muller finished this ‘Early Orthodox’ section with an epilogue comparing Calvin to these three contemporaries. Although there are 4 different approaches here, it is seen that the predestination of individuals is intimated related to Christology. All four have a functional Christology, Calvin and Musculus share an Anselmic motivation, and Musculus and Bullinger involve a covenant of grace.
What can we learn from all this?
- Whereas Calvin and Vermigli seem more oriented towards causality than Musculus and Bullinger, there is no motivation to undercut any Christological concerns. Thus, causal emphasis does not necessarily imply Christologial concern.
- Vermigli’s distinctions pertaining to God’s will would prove to be more influential than Calvin’s (eg., the uptake of decretive/permissive will). Also, Vermigli’s infralapsarian position and scholastic distinction would carry more influence. Thus, other theologians are also crucial to the development of Reformed doctrine.
- It is to the definition of the doctrine, rather than simply the placement of the doctrine that we must look when examining the causal rigor of the system. Thus, placement of a doctrine shouldn’t be the only factor of investigation.
Muller finishes the discussion of the early orthodox development of predestination, describing it as follows:
“…the doctrine as expressed by these thinkers was more than simply a scriptural doctrine: it was an Augustinian doctrine, argued as Augustine had argued it, as the divine resolution of the problem of original sin and human inability; and, likewise, it was a doctrine drawn perhaps grudgingly from the schoolmen, argued in the language of the scholastics as a doctrinal issue hedged by definitions of necessity and contingency, primary and secondary causality.”
From
Thus, if you wanted to say that the destruction of the ungodly must mean annihilation, then you’d need to say that the world was annihilated in Noah’s day – which is absurd. Or in other words: because the destruction of the flood was not a totally annihilation of being, neither will the destruction of the ungodly be total annihilation. It will be an everlasting and terrible time of torment.
Here’s the logic: if Peter doesn’t have annhilation in mind with his comparison between the destruction of the ungodly and the destruction of Noah’s world, it would seem a reasonable assertion that he does not have annhilation in mind in his comparsion between water-judgment of Noah and the return-judgment of Christ. Else, a continuity of being would apply to the reprobate, but also a complete discontinuity of being would apply to the present creation – which seems impossible. My point is that Peter’s Noah-based comparisons do not carry completely discontinuous notions of annhilation or obliteration. Without question, there is some level of discontinuity, but Peter’s comparisons carry a surprisingly strong level of continuity.
The first chapter concerns the theology of the great John Calvin. Because God is, among other attributes, infinite, omniscient, omnipresent and omnipotent, and man is finite, and limited in knowledge, presence and power, Calvin asserts that man needs a mediator to bridge the gulf of creator and creature – this is Christ who is both infinite and finite; omniscient and limited, omnipresent and local, omnipotent and humanly-empowered. Thus, Calvin writes of Christ:
Well, we’re back on the Poddy after a short hiatus sitting exams. Oh, and a well-deserved holiday of course! But we’ve been scheming the next year’s Pilgrim’s Podcast plan of action! Exciting.
One of the things which I used to believe was that when the Lord Jesus returns, the present physical universe would cease to exist. That it would be obliterated! And this all prior to the new creation forming out of nothing, ex nihilo as per the Genesis account of creation. I fair while ago I changed my mind on this, and working on last Sunday’s advent sermon (2 Peter 3) confirmed my thoughts.
When the judgment fell on the world in Noah’s time (Genesis 6-7), the world was destroyed in the sense that it was cleansed of its wickedness, and that the evil people of the world were subjected to judgment. The destruction of the world in Noah’s day did not involve an obliteration of all things, and provision of all new things. Note that the mountains and “whole heaven” did not cease to exist, but rather remained (Genesis 7:19). Thus, the destruction of Noah’s day was not a total annihilation.
Obviously it is not a 1:1, univocal comparison – for instance, the scope of the flood-judgment is global, whereas the scope of Christ-judgment is universal.